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(University of Western Sydney) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper I critically analyse contemporary discourses of corporate social responsibility 
and related discourses of sustainability and corporate citizenship.  I argue that despite their 
emancipatory rhetoric, discourses of corporate citizenship, social responsibility and 
sustainability are defined by narrow business interests and serve to curtail interests of external 
stakeholders.  I provide an alternate perspective, one that views discourses of corporate 
citizenship, corporate social responsibility, and sustainability as ideological movements that 
are intended to legitimize and consolidate the power of large corporations.  I also 
problematize the popular notion of organizational “stakeholders”.  I argue that stakeholder 
theory of the firm represents a form of stakeholder colonialism that serves to regulate the 
behavior of stakeholders.  I conclude by discussing implications for critical management 
studies.   
 
KEY WORDS:  Corporate social responsibility, sustainability, corporate citizenship, critical 
management studies, stakeholders 
 
“Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be 
damned and no body to be kicked?  (And by God, it ought to have both!)”. 
    First Baron Thurlow (1731-1806) 
Lord Chancellor of England 
 
In the corporate economies of the contemporary West, the market is a passive 
institution.  The active institution is the corporation…an inherently narrow and 
shortsighted organization … The corporation has evolved to serve the interests of 
whoever controls it, at the expense of whomever does not.  (Duggar 1989). 
 
Introduction 
 
These two quotes, made 150 years apart reflect a particular perspective of corporate social 
responsibility that is rarely found in the management literature.  While our discipline can 
hardly be accused of being critical, there are some emerging voices that are attempting to take 
a more critical look at some of the social impacts of corporate behavior.  The first quote 
attributed to First Baron Thurlow was made in the hey days of what was probably the world’s 
first multinational corporation – I refer of course to the infamous East India Company.  In an 
era of British colonial expansion, the company was engaged in conquering markets, 
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eliminating competition, securing cheap sources of raw material supply, building strategic 
alliances: in short, the empire did everything our current strategy textbooks now teach us.  
Colonial expansionist practices of the British empire in the 1800s involved both capital 
appropriation and permanent destruction of manufacturing capacities in the colonies – the 
“technological superiority” of the British textile industry for example, was established as 
much by invention as by a systematic destruction of India’s indigenous industry involving 
innovative competitive strategies such as the severing of the thumbs of master weavers in 
Bengal, forced cultivation of indigo by Bihar’s peasants and the slave trade from Africa that 
supplied cotton plantations in the US with free labor (Dutt 1970; Shiva 2001: 34). 
The second and more recent quote seems to be more relevant today in light of the recent 
corporate scandals that have rocked the United States.  What is interesting in Duggar’s quote 
is the reference to serving the interests of the people who control corporations “at the expense 
of whomever does not”. This seems to imply that corporate strategies of wealth creation 
(including corporate social responsibility) are zero sum games, which is a debatable point.  In 
this paper I discuss some cases where this is indeed the case – corporate actions and strategies 
that serve the corporate interest at the expense of segments of society.  I describe and critique 
emerging discourses of corporate citizenship, social responsibility and sustainability.  I 
discuss some of the key assumptions that frame these discourses.  I argue that despite its 
emancipatory rhetoric, discourses of corporate citizenship, social responsibility and 
sustainability are defined by narrow business interests and serve to curtail interests of external 
stakeholders.  I provide an alternate perspective, one that views discourses of corporate 
citizenship, corporate social responsibility, corporate sustainability as ideological movements 
that are intended to legitimize the power of large corporations (Mitchell 1989).  These 
discourses address a common theme: the relationship between business and society.  Whereas 
                                                                                                                                                        
 For correspondence: 
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the primary relationship between business and society has and continues to be an economic 
one, rising public concern about the social and environmental impacts of economic growth 
and increased legislation in areas of social welfare and environmental protection led many 
corporations to assess the social and environmental impacts of their business activity.  
However, these discourses as Windsor (2001) argues always represent and construct the 
relationship between business and society based on corporate interests, not societal interests. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In the first section I discuss and critique received 
knowledge about corporate social responsibility and corporate citizenship.  I provide a 
historical view of the evolution of the modern corporation and show how a specific 
intersection of interests transformed the corporation from serving the public interest to 
generating private wealth.   In the second section I critique emerging discourses on 
sustainable development and corporate sustainability and discuss some of the theoretical 
problems in applying the so-called “triple bottom line” approach to evaluate social 
performance of business.  In particular I problematize the popular notion of organizational 
“stakeholders”.  I argue that stakeholder theory of the firm represents a form of stakeholder 
colonialism that serves to regulate the behavior of stakeholders.  In the third section I discuss 
the complex power dynamics that underlie relationships between corporations, governments 
and international institutions.  I conclude by discussing implications for critical management 
studies.   
Social Responsibility and the Modern Corporation 
A historical tour of the emergence of the modern corporation will help contextualize my 
analysis of current discourses on corporate social responsibility.  An understanding of the 
historical role that the “social” played in the development of the corporation in its modern 
form will allow us to see how shifting power structures in the economy, society and polity 
construct the terrain of corporate social responsibility.  In his book “Organizing America”, 
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Charles Perrow (2002: 31) described the economic, political, and social forces that combined 
to create the “legal revolution that launched organizations” in the United States.  Distancing 
themselves from the colonial system of royal corporate charters from the British monarchy, 
American colonists set up systems of government that effectively served as state charters to 
corporations.  State legislatures in 19th century America were the only bodies that had the 
power to grant special charters of incorporation, charters that specified what a corporation 
could or could not do, how long it could exist and how it was obliged to serve the public 
interest.  In fact since a corporation needed a special act of state legislature to exist legally, 
exercising corporate powers without a grant of legislative authority was considered to be an 
“invasion of sovereign prerogative” (Hessen 1979: 3).  However, critics of this view claim 
that “corporate features could be acquired without incorporation” and hence a corporation 
need not be considered “a creature of the state” (Hessen 1979: 29). 
In the legal environment of the 1800s, the state in the initial formulation of corporate law 
could revoke the charter of a corporation if it failed to act in the public good and routinely did 
so.  For instance, banks lost their charters in Mississippi, Ohio, and Pennsylvania for 
“committing serious violations that were likely to leave them in an insolvent or financially 
unsound condition”.  In Massachusetts and New York, charters of turnpike corporations were 
revoked for “not keeping their roads in repair” (Derber 1998: 124).   In one legal ruling in 
1815 the court declared, ““A private corporation created by the legislature may lose its 
franchise by a misuser or nonuser of them.  This is the common law of the land, and is a tacit 
condition annexed to the creation of every such corporation”. (Terret v. Taylor, 1815). 
However, by the end of the 19th century, restrictions around incorporation had all but 
disappeared.  As Perrow (2002: 41) argues, this was not “a mistake, an inadvertence, a 
happenstance in history, but a well-designed plan devised by particular interests who needed a 
ruling that would allow for a particular form of organization”.  If Perrow’s analysis is correct 
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then it becomes important to examine some implications.  For example, what are the 
discursive and material effects of these new forms of organization?  How have the power 
dynamics been shifted in this new regime?  What are the possible conflicts that could arise 
from unrestricted corporate activity?  If the corporation is no longer legally required to serve 
the public interest what is the role of non-governmental organizations in this regime?  While 
the wealth creating ability of modern corporations unquestionable, their social and 
environmental effects (and indeed some economic effects) are unquestionably damaging as 
well.  It is interesting that one hundred and seventy years after corporations freed themselves 
of state charters, consumer and environmental activists of the 1960s and 70s were 
campaigning for a system of federal charters to “reign in the power of large corporations”.  In 
a call for a congressional hearing on the issue, Ralph Nader declared, “The corporation is, and 
must be, the creature of the State.  Into its nostrils the State must breathe the breath of a 
fictitious life” (Nader, Green and Seligman 1976: 15). 
This legal revolution that gave birth to the modern corporation essentially removed all 
major restrictions around corporate activity and rules of incorporation.  Since the legislative 
authority of states for regulating corporate behavior was removed there was now no “official” 
requirement to serve the public interest except in the economic realm.  As the legal 
personality of the modern corporation evolved in the 1800s, contestations in the public, 
political and legal spheres revolved around the conflict between public and private interests.  
Now that the corporation was defined as an entity that could enjoy property rights the focus 
shifted to developing systems of enforcement and mechanisms that protected these rights.  
While this system of property rights gave more power to corporations in a post-charter era, it 
also served as the primary incentive to maximize economic return for shareholders. Any 
reference to “social good” was at best symbolic and derivative in that the economic function 
provided the social good.  The separation of the economic from the social in defining 
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corporate identity, in itself a political process, also mirrored the tenets of economic theories 
of the time – the notion of “externalities” for instance, where governments and other 
agencies, not economic actors were responsible in managing the negative social and 
environmental effects of economic growth. 
The landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that bestowed property rights on private 
corporations was Dartmouth College v. Woodward in 1819. The case typified the inherent 
ambiguities that arise in defining the role of a corporation, ambiguities between the economic 
and social that are yet to be resolved today.  Lawyers for Dartmouth Corporation in its move 
to free itself from state control argued that the rights of private corporations and private rights 
in general must be “protected from the rise and fall of popular parties and the fluctuations of 
political opinions” (Perrow, 2002: 41).  Chief Justice John Marshall concurred, declaring that 
“… a corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible. And existing only in 
contemplation of law”. (Chief Justice John Marshall, Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 
1819).   Establishing the legitimacy of a “fictitious legal person” or an “artificial legal entity” 
distinct from its owners and officers (Hessen, 1979: xiv) had two effects: first, it effectively 
put an end to the argument that the corporation was a creature of the state thus limiting public 
representation and second, by conferring private rights on corporations, rights normally held 
by individuals the court automatically guaranteed a system that would protect those rights.  
Thus, an artificial legal entity like a corporation is entitled to protection under the 14th 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  As we shall see these legislative requirements were 
designed to protect private interests, often at the expense of the public.  The legal personality 
of the modern corporation was created by certain interests to deliver specific outcomes that 
needed a particular form of organization and a strong state presence was inimical to these 
interests. 
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In fact, over time the state view also mirrored the corporate view as new laws were created 
in the United States that allowed states to allocate property to private corporations.  Perrow 
(2002) describes how powerful private interests in the railroad industry, the “big business” of 
the 1800s, with a combination of creative legal interpretations of property rights along with 
more than a few illegal activities were able to obtain rights-of-way on public land at virtually 
no cost.  Public legal actions in most cases were decided in favor of corporations in a socio-
economic climate where public purpose was defined so broadly that eminent domain and 
corporate privileges could always be justified in the name of “prosperity and growth; and in 
general for the freedom to externalize costs” (Perrow 2002: 45).  For instance, a court 
decision on a petition by Louisville residents protesting the company’s decision to lay rail 
lines across their neighborhood declared: 
 
“A railroad will be allowed to run its locomotives into the heart of Louisville 
despite the noise and pollution from its smokestacks (the externality), because so 
necessary are the agents of transportation in a populous and prospering country 
that private injury and personal damage must be expected” (1839 Kentucky court 
decision, cited in Perrow 2002). 
 
If a corporation had the legal right to externalize the social and environmental costs of its 
business activity with impunity, its responsibility to the larger community was less clear and 
definitely not one mandated by law in the new regime of incorporation.  While the property 
rights of the private “agents of transportation” had to be respected, the “necessary 
externalities” should be dealt with not by the corporation but by someone else.  Contemporary 
notions of corporate social responsibility and corporate citizenship that deploy the “legal 
fiction” argument of the corporation in order to create a legal soul for the artificial corporate 
person run the danger of conflating citizenship with personhood.  A corporation cannot be a 
citizen in the same way a person can.  A corporation can however be considered a person as 
far its legal status is concerned.  Current notions of corporate citizenship conflate citizen 
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(which as Windsor (2001) argues a business corporation cannot be) and person (which a 
corporation can be but only as a “legal fiction”).  Thus, as Windsor (2001: 4) points out 
“fictional personhood is not a sound basis for artificial citizenship” and theories of corporate 
social responsibility that take the citizenship approach will tend to be limited in defining the 
scope of responsibility.  The problem is compounded in the case of multinational firms where 
there in no constitutional or legal basis for MNCs  to becoming “world citizens”.  We do not 
have a system whereby international bodies like the United Nations can charter a particular 
business. 
While the law recognizes a corporation’s metaphorical personhood allowing it to enter into 
contracts and promote private property rights, the metaphorical soul of the corporation and its 
corresponding responsibilities cannot be legally prescribed.  Thus, social responsibility, an 
integral part of a corporation’s identity and existence in the 1800s now becomes an activity 
devolved to the corporation, a strategic choice influenced by market and competitive factors.  
This process of redefinition was an exercise of political and economic power by a minority 
interest group promoting a particular ideology that “redefined the character of the Republic in 
order to justify the new opportunities that the corporation offered for the accumulation of 
private wealth” (Harvard Law Review: 1886-7).  Changes in the legal environment also 
shifted the onus of addressing the “social” from corporations to governments.  However, 
while new organizational forms were proving to create wealth for the few people that owned 
them, social and environmental costs continued to be passed off as externalities.  There was 
little recognition, at least in legislative circles, that the kind of organization profit-seeking 
corporations build “determine social costs that the society will bear, and the powers and 
freedoms that the organizations will have” (Perrow 2002: 143).  However, these anxieties 
were voiced in several sections of the business press of the time by intellectuals, workers, 
union officials, artisans and entrepreneurs. 
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It would be naïve of us to assume that the “legal revolution” was launched uniformly and 
spontaneously with the public interest in mind.  Large corporations in the 1800s wielded 
considerable economic and political power and some 19th century underhand skullduggery 
strategies would  bring a blush even to the crooks that ran Enron.   In his historical analysis of 
the railroad industry in 19th century America, Perrow (2002) describes an impressive list of 
activities that could hardly be considered “social”. Judges and legislators were routinely 
bought, shady financial dealings like watering stock, misuse of stock in paying dividends, 
obtaining public funds through deception, misuse of public funds, and violation of legal 
statutes were common.  In fact, the level of corruption was such that Perrow (2002: 143) 
argues ease of corruption should be added to the usual factors of production such as land, 
labor, capital, technology and organizational form.  He rightly points out that corruption 
involved considerable social costs in terms of wasting a society’s resources, risking the lives 
and health of communities and workers due to evasion of environmental health and safety 
laws, and increasing negative externalities. Corrupting the legislature and judiciary meant that 
corporations could shape their own powers and freedoms.  As he argues: 
 “Corruption meant that the profits were not returned to either the government 
that subsidized so much of the railroads, or even to many of the private investors, 
but to a small group of executives and financiers.  This concentrated wealth and 
the power that comes with it.  Corruption counts, but few historians and social 
scientists have done any counting.  Instead, they tend to blame the victims, not the 
perpetrators – the large organizations.  There are no accounts of railroads as 
corporations engaged in lobbying, joining with merchants and shippers in getting 
public funds, fighting regulation and accountability, and generally using the 
organizational tool to shape the commercial world to their liking (Perrow, 2002: 
144).    
 
It is important to realize that the legal developments that created the modern corporation 
did not go uncontested.  Anti-corporate protests were strong in the mid-1850s as they were on 
the streets of Seattle one hundred and fifty years later.  But, as Perrow (2002) points out, these 
protests were more a reflection of the anxiety about the growing powers of corporate 
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capitalism as opposed to any resistance to capitalist ideals per se.  Individual entrepreneurs, 
workers and artisans with restricted access to capital supported private property rights for 
individuals because it could provide freedom from wage dependence.  However, they 
opposed easy incorporation of corporations without a state charter because opportunities for 
self-employment would be limited.  A community of self-employed artisans and traders with 
shared interests was seen as a public good which was threatened by permanent wage 
dependence (Perrow, 2002).  In fact, a union publication declared in 1835: 
“We entirely disapprove of the incorporation of Companies, for carrying on 
manual mechanical business, inasmuch as we believe their tendency is to 
eventuate in and produce monopolies, thereby crippling the energies of individual 
enterprise, and invading the rights of smaller capitalists” (cited in Harvard Law 
Review 1989: 1989).  
 
Concerns about the effect of “commerce” on society and “political virtue” were the source 
of early public hostility towards corporations.  Easy incorporation laws that would 
dramatically expand the power of corporations were seen as creating new forms of 
dependency that “threatened the capacity of citizenship” (Harvard Law Review, 1989: 1891).  
There was a fear that in the Republic a new form of aristocracy would be created, “depending 
for its wealth on government privileges and therefore with an interest in corrupting 
government by diverting it from the public good” (Harvard Law Review 1989: 1891).  Small 
entrepreneurs, artisans and farmers were also concerned their livelihoods would be destroyed 
because of the new privileges granted to corporations. 
Debates about the role of corporations in their new entity centered around two 
assumptions:  that the corporation was inherently guided by self-interest or that a corporation 
has an “enduring capacity to operate on the basis of civic virtue” (Regan 1998: 305).  The 
first notion also reflected in economic theories of the firm where the focus is on efficiencies 
required to maximize rent-seeking opportunities.  The second notion refers to the legitimacy 
of a corporation and its role in society. Thus, to quote Dahl (1973) 
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“Business corporations are created and survive only as a special privilege of the 
state.  It is absurd to regard the corporation simply as an enterprise established for 
the sole purpose of allowing profit-making.  One has simply to ask: Why should 
citizens, through their government, grant special rights, powers, privileges, and 
protections to any firm except on the understanding that its activities are to fulfill 
their purposes? Corporations exist because we allow them to do so” (Dahl 1973: 
11). 
 
The problem with the efficiency-legitimacy dichotomy is that in public policy it is often the 
case that legitimacy becomes subordinate to efficiency because notions and terms of 
legitimacy are discursively produced and defined by economic efficiency criteria.  As Regan 
(1998) has argued both assumptions are problematic for society.  Assuming that the 
corporation is solely guided by narrow economic self-interest tends to reinforce structures that 
will lead to this outcome.  According to Regan (1998: 305) it also denies agency to the 
multitude of people who work in corporations and are “denied the exercise of full moral 
autonomy”.  Here, Regan seems to refer to the received view of corporate social 
responsibility that recognized institutional, organizational and individual levels of 
responsibility where the “principle of managerial discretion” meant that managers could 
exercise their own autonomous moral judgment on business decisions (Carrol, 1979).  
According to Wood (1991: 698), “managers are moral actors. Within every domain of 
corporate social responsibility, they are obliged to exercise such discretion as is available to 
them, toward socially responsible outcomes”.  The fallacy of managers as “moral actors” is 
easily revealed by the Foucauldian notion of subjectification, a mode that reveals how 
managers become constituted as subjects who secure their meaning and reality through 
identifying with a particular sense of their relationship with the firm (Knights, 1992).  
Individual managers’ role in accommodating stakeholder interests is predefined at higher 
levels and practices at this level are governed and organized by organizational and 
institutional discourses.  Do managers really have genuine freedom to make socially 
responsible decisions? 
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A second outcome of the self-interest assumption is that it leads to a free rider scenario 
where corporations will not usually take the socially responsible course of action unless it 
meets their profitability criteria (Regan 1998).  This view is reflected in the “corporate social 
responsibility is good for business” refrain heard from many CEOs, government officials, 
academics, NGOs and the like.  If the sole obsession is with profits then governments and 
other agencies need to regulate business to produce socially beneficial outcomes, which is 
another shortcoming with this approach.  Laws are usually created after the fact and cannot 
anticipate every instance of social evil.  Monitoring compliance in a command and control 
system can be an expensive process involving high transaction costs.  Moreover, it is naïve to 
think that laws governing the behavior of corporations are made in isolation and not without 
active involvement from industry.  Political lobbying as a corporate strategy has more than a 
200 year history. 
The implications of the second assumption, that a corporation is capable of operating on 
the basis of civic virtue, serves to limit legal constrains on a virtuous corporation with the 
corresponding risk that managers can operate without impunity and accountability.  In a 
relaxed legal environment, competitive pressures and market demand and supply become the 
only key drivers of corporate behavior, which could have negative social outcomes.  Both the 
mechanisms of the market and the law appear to preclude civic virtue.   However, as Regan 
(1998: 305) points out, “both expecting civic virtue from corporations and denying its 
possibility create risks that may exacerbate rather than resolve the tension”.  
Disputes between “social” and corporate interests that entered the legal arena tended to 
muddy social responsibilities of the modern corporation and narrow the focus of the board of 
directors to generating shareholder wealth.  In one celebrated case, the Ford Motor Company 
was taken to court by its shareholders who contested the company’s plan to forego the 
payment of special dividends.  Henry Ford, in the middle of implementing one of his social 
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engineering plans declared to the court that he chose to forego the dividend payment be cause 
the company wanted   “…to employ still more men; to spread the benefits of this individual 
system to the greatest possible number; to help them build up their lives and their homes” 
(Henry Ford, 1919, cited in Regan, 1998).  The court disagreed, ruling that,  
“A business organization is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of 
the stockholders.  Directors cannot shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation 
for the mere incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of 
benefiting others” (Dodge vs Ford Motor Company 1919, cited in Regan 1998).   
 
Now a literal interpretation of this ruling could mean that it is illegal to be socially 
responsible.  However, managers do have some discretion in determining the best way to 
enhance shareholder value.  Had Henry Ford chosen to be a little less modest about his plans 
for society and restated his argument concentrating on the long-term financial benefits of his 
“social investment”, the court may well have accepted his argument.  Hertz (2001) mentions a 
similar case where the court ruled that a donation to a civil rights group by Kodak was not a 
“financially responsible” investment and ordered the company to accede to shareholders’ 
demand to pay the amount as dividends instead.  However, some recent rulings have 
attempted to include some level of stakeholder recognition by emphasizing that directors do 
not “have a duty to the shareholders but instead have a duty to the corporation” (Cunningham, 
1999: 1294).  Another ruling stated that directors in considering the best interests of the 
corporation consider “the effects of any action upon any or all groups affected by such action, 
including shareholders, employees, suppliers….” (Cunningham 1994: 1294).   However, this 
simply allows company directors to consider public interests, it is not legally binding in any 
way, thus limiting whatever attention corporate elites will pay social concerns.  For instance, 
the American Bar Association states:  “While allowing directors to give consideration to the 
interests of others, the law compels them to find some reasonable relationship to the long-
term interests of shareholders when so doing” (American Bar Association 1990).  Thus, as 
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Regan (1998: 305) puts it, “the operation of both law and the market therefore systematically 
tend to deprive corporations of the capacity to cultivate civic virtue”.  
If the legal revolution that launched the modern corporation was one that served particular 
interests, the same can be said of the current rhetoric in corporate boardrooms about 
“corporate social responsibility” and “corporate citizenship”.  The power of this rhetoric lies 
in its ability to validate a particular form of ideology along with its accompanying 
epistemological and ontological assumptions.  Thus, from a critical perspective corporate 
social responsibility becomes an ideological movement designed to consolidate the power of 
large corporations.  In the next section I will discuss how “progressive” discourses of 
corporate social responsibility, corporate citizenship, and sustainability create a particular 
form of corporate rationality that despite its emancipatory intent serves to marginalize large 
groups of people. 
Corporate Social Responsibility, Stakeholders and 
Sustainability:  Holy Trinity or Praxis of Evil? 
 
An examination of some definitions of corporate social responsibility from the literature will 
help contextualize my discussion and critique of the concept.  In a textbook on corporate 
strategy, Johnson and Scholes (2002: 247) state, “Corporate social responsibility is concerned 
with the ways in which an organisation exceeds the minimum obligations to stakeholders 
specified through regulation and corporate governance”.   The World Business Council 
defines CSR as “the commitment of business to contribute to sustainable economic 
development working with employees, their families, the local community and society at 
large to improve their quality of life (World Business Council 2005).  The Australia 
Standards Association in developing a standard for corporate social responsibility defines 
CSR as “a mechanism to voluntary integrate social and environmental concerns into their 
operations and their interactions with their stakeholders, which are over and above the 
 16 
entities’ legal responsibilities.  This encourages a culture of compliance for all entities.  This 
standard is seen as assisting entities in achieving a culture of compliance”.  A common theme 
running through these definitions is the voluntary and discretionary nature of corporate social 
responsibility.  There is also an expectation that CSR activities “exceed” a corporation’s legal 
responsibilities.  The Australian Standards’ point about encouraging “a culture of 
compliance” is curious to say the least because one could interpret this as meaning that 
corporations currently don’t have a culture of compliance and should be encouraged to 
develop one.  
Caroll (1979) discussed three principles of CSR that operate at different levels of analysis. 
At the institutional level the principle of legitimacy focuses on obligations and sanctions that 
determine the boundaries of business-society relationships. There is an assumption here that 
governments or societies determine the legitimacy of a particular business and can impose 
sanctions on illegitimate corporate activity. How societal obligations of corporations can be 
enforced is another matter: as we have seen earlier the main obligation of corporations in their 
current form are to their shareholders.  At the organizational level the principle of public 
responsibility focuses on a firm taking responsibility for its business activities.  At the 
individual level the principle of managerial discretion focuses on the morality and ethics of 
individual managers. 
Research on corporate social responsibility (CSR) is not new and dates back at least 50 
years.  The two major camps hold divergent views – from the almost tiresome Friedman 
cliché of “the business of business is business” to a vastly more accommodating (although 
ultimately meaningless if taken to the extreme) stakeholder framework.  While the Friedman 
camp is dismissive, in fact downright suspicious about corporate social responsibility outside 
the shareholder value framework, the fact remains that corporate social responsibility is 
publicly espoused by almost all the major corporations of the world.  Margolis and Walsh 
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(2003) in a study of 127 empirical studies conducted during 1972-2002 measuring the 
relationship between corporate social performance and corporate financial performance found 
that about half the studies found a positive relationship.  The research findings are not 
convincing however, and recent reviews have pointed out serious shortcomings ranging from 
sampling problems, measurement issues, omission of controls, and more significantly lack of 
explanatory theory linking CSR with financial performance (Margolis and Walsh 2003).  
However, the authors found little evidence of a negative relationship, which would certainly 
weaken the Friedman case of CSR having negative financial effects.  In other words there is 
no evidence to state that CSR can harm the wealth-generating ability of business firms which 
should lead to alleviating concerns about shareholder value.  In any case corporate rationality 
dictates the nature and scope of acceptable CSR practices engineering the inevitable 
compromise of making a business case for corporate social responsibility. 
Commenting on the results of a meta-analysis of more than 25 years of empirical studies 
on the link between corporate economic and social performance, Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes 
(2003) claimed that the literature was “over inclusive” in defining organizational stakeholders 
and called for a more “restrictive” concept of stakeholders in order to establish a stronger 
link.  This implies a focus on stakeholders who can influence the financial or competitive 
position of the firm, leaving little or no resources directed to serve the interests of 
marginalized stakeholder groups.  Thus, corporate social responsibility becomes a product or 
service strategy designed to sustain a competitive advantage (Martin 2002; McWilliams and 
Siegel 2001).  However the limits of corporate rationality when applied to social issues are 
exposed if we take this argument further.  If CSR is indeed a competitive strategy, it is not a 
particularly valuable one in terms of its imitability: the very visible nature of CSR practices 
makes it easier for competitors to develop similar strategies (McWilliams and Siegel 2001).  
It is no accident that the vast array of industry codes of conduct on a variety of practices are 
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developed by the leading competitors in the industry.  Research on environmental strategies 
has shown that once all economic actors have realized the immediate benefits of 
environmental improvements, the low-hanging fruit of cost savings and efficiency increases, 
every incremental environmental improvement now required a substantially larger level of 
investment with a much longer time horizon that few corporations were willing to consider 
(Banerjee 2001b; Sharma and Vredenburg 1998).   Corporate social responsibility in this 
framework is limited to win-win situations starting with the assumption that it makes good 
business sense and enhances shareholder value. 
The current debate about CEO compensation is a case in point.  One recent study has 
shown that the relationship between CEO pay to stock performance is negative: the CEOs of 
10 large US corporations that posted negative returns in terms of their 2003 stock 
performance received significant pay increases in terms of salaries, bonuses and stock options 
(Strauss 2003).  Another study found that the biggest CEO raises were linked to the largest 
layoffs.  While the median pay increase for CEOs was 6% in 2002, the figure for CEOs of 50 
companies that announced the biggest layoffs in 2001 jumped to 44% (Kristof 2003).  Of 
course all of these 50 companies produce slick, glossy corporate social responsibility reports 
annually. And the argument that this is somehow good for the global economy begs the 
question: whose globe and whose economy? 
I will not review the vast literature on corporate citizenship and social responsibility here.  
More than 50 years of research in the field has produced a variety of theoretical concepts 
along with some limited (and somewhat dubious) empirical evidence on the relationship 
between corporate social responsibility and firm performance.  An examination of the 
literature indicates that the rationale and assumptions behind the corporate social 
responsibility discourse are: (1) corporations should think beyond making money and pay 
attention to social and environmental issues (2) corporations should behave in an ethical 
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manner and demonstrate the highest level of integrity and transparency in all their operations 
(3) corporations should be involved with the community they operate in terms of enhancing 
their social welfare and providing community support through philanthropy or other means.  
These notions of corporate citizenship should be operationalized through engagement and 
dialogue with stakeholders (another term that seems to be unproblematically and uncritically 
accepted in the literature) and corporations should always engage their stakeholders and build 
relationships with them (Waddock 2001).  The normative core of this discourse is not hard to 
ascertain: the assumption is that corporations should do all these things because (1) good 
corporate citizenship is related to good financial performance (despite the dubious nature of 
empirical evidence of this relationship) and (2) if a corporation is a bad citizen then its licence 
to operate will be revoked by “society”. Both of these are simplistic assumptions with little 
theoretical or empirical support.  Large transnational corporations responsible for major 
environmental disasters and negative social impacts in the Third World (Union Carbide, 
Nike, Exxon, Shell to name a few) rather than lose their licence to operate have actually 
become stronger and more powerful whether through mergers, restructures or relentless 
public relations campaigns.  While it is true that public outcry and consumer boycotts have 
forced these corporations to change some practices and develop codes of conduct it is 
important to realize that these codes are voluntary and not legally enforceable. 
There is also some disagreement about terminology: while some writers view corporate 
citizenship and corporate social responsibility as synonymous (Swanson and Niehoff 2001; 
Waddock, 2001), others argue that whereas corporate citizenship focuses more on internal 
organizational values, corporate social responsibility focuses on the externalities associated 
with corporate behavior (Birch 2001; Wood and Logsdon 2001).  Some argue that the roots of 
the two discourses are also different:  corporate citizenship is a more practitioner-based 
approach whereas the discourse of corporate social responsibility emerged from the academic 
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community (Davenport, 2000).  There is also another concern that corporate citizenship 
discourses could have the effect of reducing governmental scrutiny of corporate practices 
because they promote a particular form of self-governance.  Corporate strategies of 
responding to social and environmental concerns have led to a bewildering array of “codes of 
conduct” on a variety of issues, none of which are legally enforceable. There are no 
legislative requirements that corporations serve the public interest, thus opening up what Alan 
Greenspan calls more “pathways to greed” raising justifiable concerns about self-governance, 
given the enormous influence and power wielded by large multinational corporations (Allen 
and Regan 1998). 
There is a remarkable lack of critical examination in the literature of these concepts of 
corporate citizenship.  The literature on corporate social responsibility easily identifies “bad” 
corporate citizens: tobacco companies, weapons manufacturers, environmental polluters.  
However, the fact that these companies regularly publish corporate citizenship and social 
performance reports tends to muddy the waters more than a little.  Thus, a recent report 
released by the Vice President, Corporate Affairs and Social Responsibility of Phillip Morris, 
outlines their “values-based culture” that demonstrates “integrity, honesty, respect and 
tolerance” while promising “transparency” and “stakeholder engagement” (Phillip Morris 
2002).  How tobacco firms can use these concepts to produce “socially responsible” cigarettes 
is of course another matter.  These concepts are echoed by academics as well: for instance, 
Birch (2001: 59-60.) in developing a conceptual framework of corporate citizenship outlines 
“12 generic principles of corporate citizenship” including “making a difference, employee 
and stakeholder empowerment, transparency, accountability, sharing responsibility, 
inclusivity, sustainable capitalism, a triple bottom line, long-termism, communication, 
engagement and dialogue”.  It is interesting to see how these theoretical principles are 
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seamlessly integrated into corporate policy statements.  For example, the following excerpt 
from the corporate responsibility annual report of a large multinational corporation: 
The principles that guide our behavior are based on our vision and values and include the 
following: 
 Respect: We will work to foster mutual respect with 
communities and stakeholders who are affected by our 
operations  Integrity: We will examine the impacts, positive and negative, 
of our business on the environment, and on society, and will 
integrate human, health, social and environmental 
considerations into our internal management and value system.  Communication: We will strive to foster understanding and 
support our stakeholders and communities, as well as measure 
and communicate our performance.  Excellence:  We will continue to improve our performance and 
will encourage our business partners and suppliers to adhere to 
the same standards. 
 
This corporation, voted by Fortune Magazine for six consecutive years as the most 
“innovative company in North America”; for three consecutive years as one of the “100 best 
companies to work for in America” and on Fortune Magazine’s “All star list of global most 
admired companies” is of course none other than Enron (Enron 2002).  Glossy corporate 
social responsibility reports are a form of “greenwashing”1 that often do not reveal the grim 
realities that lie behind them.  To quote the words of a famous philosopher, Marx (Groucho, 
not Karl), “The secrets of success in business are honesty and transparency.  If you can fake 
that, you’ve got it made”. 
While stakeholder empowerment is indeed a noble goal, one wonders how this would 
affect the economic performance of a firm when the stakeholders it is supposed to “empower” 
                                                 
1
 The Oxford English Dictionary defines greenwash as “disinformation disseminated by an organization so as 
to present an environmentally responsible public image”.  The non-governmental organization CorpWatch has a 
less charitable definition of greenwash: “the phenomenon of socially and environmentally destructive 
corporations attempting to preserve and expand their markets by posing as friends of the environment and 
leaders in the struggle to eradicate poverty”. 
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have opposing agendas to industry, for example in the current conflicts between mining and 
resource companies and indigenous communities (Banerjee, 2000; Banerjee, 2001a).  In my 
work with two indigenous communities in Australia I sought “stakeholder input” about the 
presence of a mine on indigenous land.  The response was unanimous: both communities 
wanted the mining company (a very, very, very large multinational company) to “clean up, 
pack up, leave and never come back”, to quote the words of one traditional owner.  The 
company’s response was to hire an anthropologist to “consult” with communities on how best 
to expand its operations.  The fact that these “consultations” take place under drastically 
unequal power relations remains unaddressed.  As Tatz (1982) points out, Aboriginal 
communities are the “receivers of consultation, that is, that Aboriginal people are from time 
to time talked to about the decisions arrived at” (p.176, original emphasis).  In every case 
involving “consultation” with traditional owners in Australia, the focus was not whether or 
not mining should proceed but under what conditions should it be carried out.  Royalties, 
promises of jobs, pitting one community against another are some strategies that have proved 
useful for mining companies. 
Interlocking with discourses of corporate social responsibility is the discourse on 
sustainability and several CSR policy documents such as the European Union white paper on 
CSR, the United Nations Global Compact address environmental and social issues.  However, 
as we shall see in the next section, the emergent discourse on “sustainability”, which 
originally promoted sustainable development as an alternate paradigm to the growth model 
but like the modern Western environmental movement, has been hijacked by corporate 
interests. 
Sustainable Development as Corporate Sustainability 
The concept of sustainable development emerged in the 1980’s in an attempt to explore the 
relationship between development and the environment.  While there are over 100 current 
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definitions of sustainable development (Holmberg and Sandbrook1992), the one most 
commonly used is that of Brundtland (WCED 1987).  According to the Brundtland 
Commission, sustainable development is “a process of change in which the exploitation of 
resources, direction of investments, orientation of technological development, and 
institutional change are made consistent with future as well as present needs” (WCED, 1987: 
9).  This broad “definition” is at the root of several controversies and there is considerable 
disagreement among scholars in different disciplines on how this definition should be 
operationalized and how sustainability should be measured.  The Brundtland definition is 
really not a definition, it is a slogan and slogans, however pretty, do not make theory.  As 
several authors have pointed out, the Brundtland definition does not elaborate on the notion 
of human needs and wants (Kirkby et al. 1995; Redclift 1987) and the concern for future 
generations is problematic as well in its operationalization.  Given the scenario of limited 
resources, this assumption becomes a contradiction as most potential consumers (future 
generations) are unable to access the present market or as Martinez-Alier (1987: 17) elegantly 
puts it, “individuals not yet born have ontological difficulties in making their presence felt in 
today’s market for exhaustible resources”. 
Apart from attempting to reconcile economic growth with environmental maintenance, the 
sustainable development agenda of Brundtland also focuses on social justice and human 
development within the framework of social equity and the equitable distribution and 
utilization of resources.  Sustainability, as Redclift (1987) points out, means different things 
to different people.  Although theories of sustainability sometimes stress the primacy of social 
justice, the position is often reversed where “justice is looked upon as subordinate to 
sustainability, and since neither sustainability nor social justice has determinate meanings, 
this opens the way to legitimizing one of them in terms of the other” (Dobson 1998: 242).  
The terms sustainability and sustainable development are used interchangeably in both 
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academic and popular discourses and the concept is promoted by “situating it against the 
background of sustaining a particular set of social relations by way of a particular set of 
ecological projects” (Harvey 1996: 148).  Thus, the debate about resource scarcity, 
biodiversity, population and ecological limits is ultimately a debate about the “preservation of 
a particular social order rather than a debate about the preservation of nature per se.” (Harvey 
1996: 148). 
Thus, the challenge is to find new technologies and to expand the role of the market in 
allocating environmental resources with the assumption that putting a price on the natural 
environment is the only way to protect it, unless degrading it becomes more profitable (Beder 
1994).  Rather than reshaping markets and production processes to fit the logic of nature, 
sustainable development uses the logic of markets and capitalist accumulation to determine 
the future of nature (Shiva 1991).  The language of capital is quite apparent in discourses of 
sustainable development. 
For instance, Pearce et al. (1989) emphasize “constancy of natural capital stock” as a 
necessary condition for sustainability.  According to Pearce et al. (1989), changes in the stock 
of natural resources should be “non-negative” and man-made capital (products and services as 
measured by traditional economics and accounting) should not be created at the expense of 
natural capital (including both renewable and non-renewable natural resources).  Thus, 
growth or wealth must be created without resource depletion.  Exactly how this is to be 
achieved remains a mystery.  A majority of the sustainable development literature is of this 
“eco-modernist” and addresses ways to operationalize the Brundtland concept.  Thus, 
concepts such as “sustainable cost,” “natural capital,” or “sustainable capital” are developed 
and touted as evidence of a paradigm shift (Bebbington and Gray 1993).  There is limited 
awareness of the fact that traditional notions of capital, income and growth continue to inform 
this “new” paradigm.  The uncritical acceptance of the current system of markets is also 
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problematic:  while markets are indeed efficient mechanisms to set prices they are incapable 
of reflecting true costs, such as the replacement costs of an old growth tropical rainforest or 
the social costs of tobacco and liquor consumption (Hawken 1995).  
Many large transnational corporations developed environmental and social responsibility 
policies in response to the broader critique of industrialization that emerged in the 1960s and 
1970s.  Public perceptions of environmental problems along with increased environmental 
legislation are two key reasons why the environment became an important issue for 
corporations resulting in the need for companies to “sell environmentalism” in order to be 
perceived as green (Banerjee 2001b; Newton and Harte 1997).  Newton and Harte (1997: 91) 
argue that organizations also paint themselves green to avoid regulatory control: one of the 
aims of the “Vision of Sustainable Development” promoted by the World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development is to “maintain entrepreneurial freedom through voluntary 
initiatives rather than regulatory coercion.” 
That corporations play a significant role in the path to sustainability is not in doubt.  The 
question is, are current environmental practices compatible with notions of sustainability?  
Some researchers caution that the greening of industry should not be confused with the notion 
of sustainable development (Pearce et al. 1989; Schot et al. 1997; Welford 1997; Westley and 
Vredenburg 1996).  While there have been significant advances in pollution control and 
emission reduction, this does not mean that current modes of development are sustainable for 
the planet as a whole (Hart 1997).  Most companies focus on operational issues when it 
comes to greening and lack a “vision of sustainability” (Hart 1997).  In a recent “Greening of 
Industry” conference, the proposed corporate strategy for sustainable development had no 
surprises: the focus was on “scientific innovation, public service and turning the world 
populations into active consumers of its new products, and expanding global business into the 
less affluent segments of the world’s population” (Rossi et al. 1999: 275). 
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Discourses of sustainable development are becoming increasingly corporatized.  For 
instance, the Dow Jones recently launched a “Sustainability Group Index” after a survey of 
Fortune 500 companies.  A sustainable corporation was defined as one “that aims at 
increasing long-term shareholder value by integrating economic, environmental and social 
growth opportunities into its corporate and business strategies” (Dow Jones Sustainability 
Group Index 2000).  It is interesting to observe how notions of sustainability are constructed, 
manipulated and represented in both the popular business press and academic literature.  As 
evidence of the deleterious effects of development mounted, the discourse shifted from 
sustainable development to the more positive sounding sustainability and then shifted the 
focus to corporate sustainability.  Corporate discourses on sustainability produce an elision 
that displaces the focus from global planetary sustainability to sustaining the corporation 
through “growth opportunities” (Banerjee 2003).  What happens if environmental and social 
issues do not result in growth opportunities remains unclear, the assumption being that global 
sustainability can be achieved only through market exchanges.  Despite framing sustainable 
development as a “strategic discontinuity”, that will change “today’s fundamental economics” 
corporate discourses on sustainable development, not surprisingly, promote the business-as-
usual (except greener) line and do not describe any radical change in world-views.  Even 
national governments and international organizations like the United Nations promote 
sustainability as a business case a consequence of which is that business, not societal or 
ecological, interests define the parameters of sustainability. 
Any analysis of the history of corporate citizenship must also reflect the history of 
corporate power.  North American corporations for example, originally conceived in the 18th 
century as entities serving the public interest, have over the past 200 years systematically 
diminished the power of state and federal governments in regulating or governing their 
activity.   One way to theorize the complex interactions between society, economy and the 
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polity and understand the rationality that produces particular institutions, mechanisms, 
knowledge and practices is to examine the interplay of different forms of power which is 
what I discuss in the next section. 
Power and Politics 
Focuault’s notions of discourse, power/knowledge and governmentality can provide valuable 
insights into how a particular rationality is generated.  Foucault’s analysis of discourse 
examined how the circulation of power produces a power/knowledge nexus where the effect 
of power relations on society is dependent on the production of discourses of truth through 
the production of knowledge (Clifford 2001).  The power of science and the scientific method 
in everyday discourse is an example of how science normalizes social and cultural realms, not 
because of the superior rationality of science but because of its procedures of normalization 
arising from its disciplinary power.  This disciplinary power is not located at a “legitimate” 
site of sovereign or state but transmits itself through a complex system of institutions, 
regulations, texts, policies and practices signifying not relations of sovereignty but relations 
of domination , what Foucault describes as “subjugation through a constitution of subjects”.   
Thus,  
“(Disciplinary power) is a mechanism of power that permits time and labor, 
rather than wealth and commodities, to be extracted from bodies.  It is a type 
of power which is constantly exercised by means of surveillance rather than in 
a discontinuous manner through levies and obligations over time.  It 
presupposes a tight knit grid of material coercions rather than the physical 
existence of a sovereign. This new type of power, which can no longer be 
formulated in terms of sovereignty is one of the great inventions of bourgeois 
society, a fundamental instrument in the constitution of industrial capitalism 
and the type of society that is its accompaniment” (Foucault 1980: 105). 
 
Not only are individual social and political identities and subjectivities produced under this 
power/knowledge discourse, the knowledge produced also informs institutional and social 
practices.   
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Foucault develops his notion of disciplinary power to explain the different mechanisms that 
have penetrated state apparatuses resulting in a shift in the traditional authority of the state, 
from sovereignty to what he calls governmentality emerging from a broader meaning of 
government.  Foucault’s use of the term “government” is more complex than its common 
understanding of mechanisms of state apparatus or political parties.  Government, according 
to Foucault (1979: 100), was about the “conduct of conduct”, a process aimed at shaping and 
guiding the conduct of populations.  Governmentality is not about the institutional power of 
states, rather it is a relational and discursive power that permeates society and directs social 
arrangements and informs juridical, legislative and democratic institutions.  Gordon (1991: 
42) describes this form of “social government” as 
an economy of the transeconomic, a methodology which straddles the formal 
bounds of the market.  Thus, civil society becomes the concrete ensemble 
within which economic men (sic) need to be positioned in order to be made 
adequately manageable.  It recasts the interface between state and society in 
the form of something like a second-order market of governmental goods and 
services.  It becomes the ambition of neo-liberalism to implicate the individual 
citizen, as player and partner, into this market game.   In liberal political 
economy discourse the social problem was not the anti-social effects of the 
economic market, but the anti-competitive effects of society. 
 
Governmentality, according to Foucault is simultaneously about individualizing and 
totalizing, which is a process of defining what practices, mechanisms and institutions are 
needed for an individual and for societies to be governed or made governable.  The problem 
was to develop a broader political framework, beyond legal, juridical or social contracts that 
would incorporate individuals’ economic agency within a governable order (Gordon 1991).  
Classical political economy focused primarily on markets as autonomous systems without 
addressing the legal and institutional dimensions of the market.  Governmentality was about 
the introduction of economy into political practice where the role of governments was to 
“exercise power in the form of economy” (Foucault 1979: 92).  
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Governmentality, produced a particular form of political rationality, a technology of power 
that  
“became a process which isolates the economy as a specific sector of reality 
and political economy as the science and technique of intervention of the 
government in that field of reality.  It is formed by the institutions, procedures, 
analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of 
this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target 
population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy and as its 
essential technical means apparatuses of security (Foucault 1979: 102). 
 
Discursive power also creates a particular kind of rationality that influences macro social 
developmental issues, policies of meso institutional structures like the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization as well as micro level activity of 
corporations, non-governmental organizations and other agencies.  The state is a key player at 
the macro and meso levels and while some theorists believe that the power of the state has 
greatly diminished in an era of global neoliberalism (Boggs 1986; Regan 1998; Rifkin 1999), 
others argue that state power in recent years has been redistributed to be “more tightly 
connected to the needs and interests of corporations and less so to the public interest” (Bakan 
2004: 154).  For instance, the distinction between global, national and corporate interests 
becomes particularly important in the way these disputes are resolved in the World Trade 
Organization.  National environmental legislation, safety regulations, social welfare nets, 
ethical buying policies are all examples of “unfair trade practices” according to recent WTO 
rulings.  I will explore some problematic effects of imposing this kind of corporate rationality 
in the next section. 
Business, Government and International Institutions 
Corporations are one of the largest receivers of welfare in the United States in the form of 
direct subsidies that run over $75 billion (Hertz 2001).  The poorer states in the US having 
the greatest income inequality not surprisingly offer the largest tax concessions and other 
subsidies, not to mention the non-financial benefits of lax environmental regulation and a 
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“flexible” labor force (meaning no unions).  Caring for the corporation has become a bigger 
business than the caring corporation.  The impact of multinationals in the Third World is even 
more powerful.  As “carriers of democratic values” multinational companies often take on the 
role of governments in these regions, as in the case of Shell.  Here we have one company that 
generates 75% of the Nigerian government’s revenues and nearly 35% of the country’s GNP.  
As a Shell manager put it:  “Things are back to front here.  The government’s in the oil 
business and we are in local government”.  (Brian Anderson, Shell senior manager, cited in 
Hertz 2001: 173).  The distribution of this wealth is of course another matter. 
The rhetoric of corporate social responsibility also seems to confuse democracy with 
capitalism.  While the rhetoric behind American foreign policy over the last 70 years is to 
“spread democratic values”, the reality is that foreign policy decisions promote a brand of 
American liberal democracy that seeks to create a global system “based on the needs of 
private capital including the protection of private property and open access to markets” (Hertz 
2001: 78).  There is also more than an element of hypocrisy as far as “open access” is 
concerned in dozens of cases where the US government has restricted foreign access to their 
markets to protect national economic interest in several industrial sectors.  Iran, Guatemala, 
Brazil, Chile, Philippines, Panama, Venezuela are just a handful of countries where 
democracy took a back seat to American corporate interests.  Jean Kirkpatrick, former US 
ambassador to the UN in an admirable act of political doublespeak was able to reconcile these 
opposing positions.  Kirkpatrick distinguished between authoritarian regimes (Philippines, 
apartheid South Africa and Chile) and totalitarian regimes (Cuba, the former Soviet Union).  
Although authoritarian regimes were not democratic and often used violence to suppress 
dissent they “shared” American beliefs about open markets and free trade and hence it was 
acceptable for American corporations to do business in these regions.  Free markets first and 
democracy would follow was the motto.  Totalitarian regimes on the other hand were evil for 
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Kirkpatrick because “they controlled every part of society especially the economy which was 
closed to private enterprise and foreign access” (Hertz 2001: 79).  There is also a need to 
question the rhetoric of democratic values – while some of the countries mentioned above 
have made the transition to democracy the effects of economic policies of national 
governments, WTO, IMF and World Bank on marginalized populations in these regions have 
not changed and their conditions of existence continue to worsen. 
Thus, Woodrow Wilson’s declaration that the world must be made safe for democracy 
must therefore be seen in light of the kind of market fundamentalism that defines the 
parameters of democracy.  American style liberal democracy where multinational 
corporations become the carriers of democratic values to Third World regions is perfectly 
capable of functioning in authoritarian regimes, in fact these regimes are preferred, as long as 
a market economy is allowed.  Property rights and the rule of law are a must, other aspects of 
democracy such as “mass participation, an active civil society, regular free and fair elections” 
are optional and in fact expendable (Hertz 2001: 80).  Democracy also seems to be 
conveniently forgotten in many of the decisions taken at international trade or environmental 
summits.  For instance, at the 1992 Rio Summit there were open conflicts between 
corporations, their trade associations, NGOs, and indigenous community leaders over 
environmental regulations.  The demands of NGOs were shelved and a voluntary code of 
conduct developed by the Business Council for Sustainable Development (consisting mainly 
of multinational corporations) approved instead in what was supposed to be a democratic 
process of developing an action plan for sustainable development (Hawken 1995).  While the 
policies from the Rio Earth Summit and the more recent Johannesburg Earth Summit (an 
even bigger failure according to many NGOs and environmentalists) stressed the role of 
multinational corporations in promoting sustainable development, they are silent about 
corporate responsibility and accountability for environmental destruction.   Development, 
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sustainable or otherwise, in a globalizing world is inherently anti-democratic as several 
indigenous groups have found.  As Subcomandante Marcos, a spokesperson of the Zapitista 
movement in Chiapas, Mexico stated: 
“When we rose up against a national government, we found that it did not exist.  
In reality we were up against financial capital, against speculation, which is what 
makes decisions in Mexico as well as in Europe, Asia, Africa, Oceania, North 
America, South America – everywhere”. (Zapatista  1998). 
 
The story is depressingly familiar to indigenous communities all over the world.  In this case, 
officials of the World Bank met in Geneva and decided to give a loan to Mexico on condition 
they export meat under the agreements laid down by the World Trade Organization.  Land 
used by indigenous communities in Chiapas to grow corn is now used to raise cattle for fast 
food markets in the U.S. to feed fat American consumers while locking out local communities 
from participating in the benefits (there is no McDonald’s in Chiapas).  This is an inherently 
undemocratic process where peasant populations do not have the right to decide how they 
want to live.  This is another example of how imperialism operates in the Third World:  
where one “state” (in this case representing the interests of the rich countries, the international 
institutions they support and their transnational corporations) controls the effective political 
sovereignty of another political society, by force, by political collaboration, by economic, 
social or cultural dependence.  The following was a response to the Zapatista uprising by a 
multinational bank, a major financer in the restructuring of Mexico’s economy: “The 
government will need to eliminate the Zapatistas to demonstrate their effective control of the 
national territory and security policy” (Zapatista  1998). If this is an example of a corporate 
“triple bottom line” strategy to integrate social and environmental issues, the future for 
resistance movements is very bleak indeed. 
The recent North-South conflict over the World Trade Organization’s controversial Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS) is another case in point.  The 
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TRIPS agreement legitimizes private property rights through intellectual property over life 
forms.  These rights are for individuals, states and corporations, not for indigenous peoples 
and local communities.  In effect, governments are asked to change their national intellectual 
property rights laws to allow patenting of “micro-organisms, non-biological and micro-
biological processes.”  There are two related problems that arise from imposing a regime of 
intellectual property rights on indigenous knowledge.  First, “traditional” knowledge belongs 
to the indigenous community rather than to specific individuals.  Second, as indigenous 
communities all over the world have discovered, national governments are increasingly 
employing neoliberal agendas (some willingly, a majority through coercion) that have adverse 
impacts on their livelihoods by restricting community access to natural resources.  
“Equitable” sharing of commercial benefits through mutually beneficial contracts between 
indigenous groups and multinational corporations are unlikely to occur given the disparities 
in resources and capacities to monitor or enforce the terms of any contract. 
The TRIPS agreement at the Uruguay Round of the GATT was developed “in large part” 
by a committee called the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC) consisting of many 
transnational firms including Bristol Myers, Merck, Monsanto, Du Pont and Pfizer.  
Monsanto’s representative described the TRIPS strategy: 
“…(We were able to) distil from the laws of the more advanced countries the 
fundamental principles for protecting all forms of intellectual property…Besides 
selling our concept at home, we went to Geneva where we presented or document 
to the staff of the GATT Secretariat…What I have described to you is absolutely 
unprecedented in GATT.  Industry identified a major problem for international 
trade.  It crafted a solution, reduced it to a concrete proposal, and sold it to our 
own and other governments…the industries and traders of the world have played 
simultaneously the role of patients, the diagnosticians and the prescribing 
physicians” (cited in Rifkin 1999: 52). 
 
This is another example of how corporate power is wielded in the area of international 
trade and why any analysis of corporate social responsibility at the level of an individual 
organization cannot address broader social concerns.  If the “industries and traders of the 
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world” dictate global trade and environmental policies that serve certain interests then the 
question to ask is who gets excluded from these policies?  WTO policies such as TRIPS are 
developed to ensure protection of corporate rights, not community rights.  The TRIPS 
agreement resulted in mass protests by indigenous and peasant communities along with 
NGO’s in Asia, Africa and South America that continue to this day (Dawkins 1997).   
The distinction between national and corporate interests become particularly important in 
the way these disputes are resolved in the WTO.  National environmental legislation, safety 
regulations, social welfare nets, ethical buying policies are all examples of “unfair trade 
practices” as far as recent WTO rulings are concerned.  In 1996, the state of Massachusetts 
ruled that it would stop awarding government contracts to companies operating in Burma 
because of the country’s brutal human rights record.  A number of European companies 
(Unilever, Siemens, ING, ABN-Amro among them) lobbied their governments and as a result 
the EU threatened to take the case to the WTO, arguing that the ban was an unfair trade 
practice.  The courts ruled in favor of the corporations.  Lawyers representing Massachusetts 
argued that Nelson Mandela “would still be in prison had current trade rules been in force in 
the 1980s” (Hertz, 2001).  While it is true that the US Congress imposed similar restriction on 
trade with Burma that have not been challenged, the fact remains that powerful corporate 
interests could challenge them if they choose to do so. 
In several cases considered by the WTO, national laws of democratically elected 
governments have been overridden.   And exactly who are the institutions and people that 
play a highly influential role in global trade negotiations?  Trade advisory bodies representing 
business interests of member countries are key players.  However, the problem is about whose 
interests the trade advisory bodies represent.  For example, in three of the main trade advisory 
committees of the U.S. trade representative’s office, representing a total of 111 members, 
only two represented labor unions (Korten 1995).  Ninety-two represented individual 
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companies and 16 were trade industry associations (10 from the chemical industry).  More 
than a third of the member companies represented at these meetings, (referred to in WTO 
parlance as “the green room meetings” which are essentially closed door meetings with no 
access to the public) had been fined by the Environmental Protection Agency for failure to 
comply with environmental regulations (Korten 1995).  A third of the member companies had 
actively lobbied state and federal governments opposing higher environmental standards.  It is 
quite clear not only whose interests are being promoted in these world bodies but also who is 
being excluded from this process. 
Thus, despite all the strident rhetoric about the “stakeholder corporation” the reality is that 
stakeholders who do not toe the corporate line are either coopted or marginalized.  The 
stakeholder theory of the firm represents a form of stakeholder colonialism that serves to 
regulate the behavior of stakeholders. That (perceived) integration of stakeholder needs might 
be an effective tool for a firm to enhance its image is probably true.  However, for a critical 
understanding of stakeholder theory, this approach is unsatisfactory.  Effective practices of 
“managing” stakeholders and research aimed at generating “knowledge” about stakeholders 
are less systems of truth than products of power applied by corporations, governments and 
business schools (Knights, 1992).  As Wilmott (1995) points out the establishment of new 
organization theories are very much the outcome of the historical development of capitalism 
and create value only for particular people and institutions.  A view of the full picture of the 
consequences of stakeholder theory and practice requires a stepping out of the frame.  A more 
critical examination of stakeholder theory, for instance understanding that stakeholder 
relations are systematized and controlled by the imperatives of capital accumulation, may 
produce a very different picture.  Notions of power, legitimacy and urgency and the resultant 
practice of identifying stakeholder salience are contingent on the interests of nation states, 
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industries, organizations or other institutions (Wilmott 1995) and in the process of 
stakeholder integration, either negate alternative practices or assimilate them.   
Conclusion and Implications for Critical Management Studies 
So what alternative perspective of the corporation can bring about this “realignment of 
powers between actors”?  How can we make corporate social responsibility work for society 
and not just for corporations?   It is unlikely that any radical revision of corporate social 
responsibility will emerge from organizations given how this discourse is constructed at 
higher levels of the political economy.  Focusing on the individual corporation as the unit of 
analysis can only produce limited results and serves to create an organizational enclosure 
around corporate social responsibility.  For any radical revisioning to occur, a more critical 
approach to organization theory is required and new questions need to be raised not only 
about the ecological and social sustainability of business corporations but of the political 
economy itself.  Radical revisions at this level can only occur if there is a shift in thinking at a 
macro level.  We need to open up new spaces and provide new frameworks for organization-
stakeholder dialogues as well as critically examine the dynamics of the relationships between 
corporations, NGOs, governments, community groups and funding agencies.  Contemporary 
discourses of organizations and their stakeholders are inevitably constrained by “practical” 
reasons such as the profit-seeking behavior of corporations (Treviño and Weaver 1999).  
While the vast literature on corporate social responsibility, stakeholder integration and 
business ethics is based on the assumption that business is influenced by societal concerns, 
the dominance of societal interests in radically reshaping business practices is in some 
question (Mueller 1994). 
The domain of corporate social responsibility cannot be assessed by primarily economic 
criteria and neither can an environmental ethic be developed through an “ethically pragmatic 
managerial” morality that primarily serves organizational interests (Fineman, 1998; Snell, 
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2000).  While NGO’s do serve as important counterpoints, their relationships with 
corporations and governments are often ambiguous and framed by categories furnished by 
international institutions like the United Nations and World Bank, categories that are inimical 
to many groups that are negatively impacted by corporations (Spivak 1999).  Increasing 
accountability of both corporations and NGOs to local communities and translating 
“participation” in more meaningful local contexts without reducing social movements to 
some other form of domination (the prerogatives of donor agencies, for example) is a 
challenge for the future (Escobar 1992; Derman 1995).  Perhaps what is needed is some kind 
of universal charter that corporations are accountable to rather than voluntary codes of 
conduct.  The limitations of a market-based model of corporate social responsibility mirror 
the shortcomings of economic rationalism.  The term economic rationalism itself is 
problematic and needs to be unpacked.  It assumes firstly that there is something inherently 
“rational” about economics, which needs to be debated.  Secondly, it disallows alternate 
imaginaries from emerging because of its discursive power to automatically label them as 
“irrational”.  Perhaps market fundamentalism is a more appropriate term where 
fundamentalism is less about the content of any belief system and more about the strength 
with which it is defended. 
Corporations do not have the ability to take over the role of governments in contributing to 
social welfare simply because their basic function (the rhetoric of triple bottom line aside) is 
inherently driven by economic needs.  Corporations cannot replace governments.  What will 
happen to a local community that is completely dependent on its economic, social and 
environmental welfare on a multinational company once the latter decides to move its 
location?  On economic grounds of course, not social or environmental reasons.  Markets, 
however efficient they may be in setting prices, cannot be counted upon to ensure that 
corporations will always act in the interests of society.  Social investment and social justice 
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can never become a corporation’s core activity – the few companies that have tried to do this, 
Body Shop and Ben & Jerry’s come to mind, have failed and even worse been accused of 
fraudulent behavior (Entine 1995).  In the political economy we live in today, corporate 
strategies will always be made in the interests of enhancing shareholder value and return on 
capital, not social justice or morality.  And emerging attempts to conceptualize social 
responsibility as “social capital” will still fall short unless there is a radical restructuring of 
the political economy and fundamental rethinking about the role of a corporation in society.  
Social capital is not a universal good, often times it is generated for one group of people at the 
expense of some other segment of society.  The Mafia has considerable amounts of social 
capital.  So has Al Qaeeda. 
In their call for a more critical approach to management studies, Grice and Humphries 
(1997) argue for a non-managerial position whose purpose is “not performativity but 
emancipation”.  Much of current critical work in management focuses on the same questions 
and tries to provide better answers.  As we have seen, even theories of social responsibility 
despite their emancipatory intent, are avowedly managerialist and do not contribute to a 
critical understanding of the consequences of managerial decision-making.  Changing 
organizational theorizing needs a different way of thinking that asks new questions rather 
than obtaining more answers to the same questions.  It needs to ask questions from different, 
often oppositional perspectives, it is constantly suspicious of all answers.  It asks why certain 
questions are asked, why others are not asked, “why some approaches are chosen over others 
and what interests are included or excluded in this process” (Grice and Humphries 1997: 
423).  
A critical perspective on stakeholder theory would not just focus on documenting “best 
practices” in stakeholder management.  Popular dimensions of organizations that invoke 
notions such as diffusion, democracy, market, empowerment, flexibility, trust and 
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collectivity, also need to be critically examined and countered by investigating how these 
corporate objectives along with notions of “values” and “ethics” increasingly dominate all 
other “social” agendas giving rise to a new corporate colonialism that forces people to 
participate in the economy in a particular way (Goldsmith, 1997; Grice and Humphries 1997: 
425).  A critical perspective would also question the autonomy of corporate law and focus 
attention on the power dynamics between different groups in society.  Let us not forget laws 
also represent the interests of a specific class despite its self-representation as an expression 
of “universal will”.  Questions that need to be addressed include, what are the power 
dynamics underlying the political process of stakeholder partnerships?  What are the material 
and discursive effects? How do institutions reinforce hegemonic structures?  What 
institutional structures can overcome the narrow self-interest of the financial elite?  How can 
we create alternate structures of decision-making, conflict resolution and accountability? 
Mahatma Gandhi was once asked by a newspaper reporter in London about what he 
thought of Western civilization.  Gandhi replied that it might be a good idea.  Perhaps the 
same thing applies to corporate social responsibility – it may be a good idea provided it 
creates genuine change rather than reacting to changes in the political economy.  As Frank 
(2001: 143) states, management theory teaches us that the corporation is capable of resolving 
all social conflict “fairly and justly within its walls”.  It is this theory that we as critical 
scholars need to subvert.  Restoring a sense of social justice and equity cannot be achieved 
through “some final triumph of the corporation over the body and soul of humanity, but some 
sort of power that confronts business” (Frank 2001: 143).   As we debate issues of corporate 
social responsibility, corporate citizenship, sustainability and stakeholders let us never lose 
sight of the fact that companies are not the only inhabitants of this planet.  Perhaps the words 
of Subcomandante Marcos can serve as a guide: 
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“En suma no estamos propeniendo unsa revolución ortodoxa, sino algo mucho más 
difícil: una revolución que haga possible la revolución.”  (To sum up, we are not 
proposing an orthodox revolution, but something much more difficult: a revolution that 
will make the revolution possible). 
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